- Humanitarian Impact in Gaza
- Impact of War on the Environment
- Ecocide and Genocide as Eurocene Appendages
- Conclusion
To rethink IR for understanding the impact of war on the environment, it is vital to rethink colonial assumptions which occlude complexity. This could be done by evaluating history to reveal this complexity, understanding the entanglements of different forms of life, disrupting dualist logics which govern the classification of lives (human and non-human), and disrupting linearity to bring beings forth as subjects of their existence, not objects of coloniality. In viewing nature as a fluidly expansive ecology that includes the environment and people, it is possible that in targeting one form of life in Gaza, the colonial Eurocene order of Zionist occupation targets other forms which altogether constitute non-dualist being. This highlights an immediate implication of ecocide following as a result of genocide. However, in presencing the environment, it is important to look at this relationship more closely. Hence, this chapter seeks to understand how the impact of war on the environment in Gaza reveals the practice of ecocide and further, how this may be constituted by and constituting of the pursuit of genocide. The environment thus, inextricably linked from a nature populated by many beings, is targeted in the pursuit of violence on people, and becomes collateral damage of violence perpetrated. This centres neither the environment or people, nor establishes a linear flow of causality between processes targeting them (ecocide and genocide). Instead, it recognises the complexity of relations both in Gaza’s being and the colonial violence it experiences. To evaluate how this manifests in Gaza, this chapter first explores what humanitarian impact has resulted from the unfolding of a colonial history explored earlier in this study. Without turning to the implications of this on genocide yet, this is used to ground a discussion of the impact of war on the environment, evaluating how ecocide is being perpetrated in terms of different categories of analysis. To grapple with the complexity of the Zionist occupation, genocide is then discussed to reveal how the humanitarian impact and impact on the environment inform an ongoing genocide. In concluding, it is recognised that from the expansive framework discussed above to rethink IR, ecocide and genocide are co-constitutive forms of violence against nature.
Humanitarian Impact in Gaza
It is important to appraise the extent of Israel’s destruction of Gaza to contextualise what is a longer historical project designed to colonise Palestine, remove its inhabitants, and control its very nature. The environment plays a key part in how this strategy is achieved. Hence, it is important to recognise that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is intimately tied to the environmental destruction there.
The recent humanitarian reports on the situation in Gaza, as of 20 June 2025, portray a concerning advance of Eurocene violence. There are various indicators of what the direct impact on the people of Gaza has been as well as indicators of longer-term impacts for the population which may also impact the environment. At the same time, it must be recognised that Gaza was already facing difficulties. Before October 7, 2023, due to Israel’s blockade, Gaza had a high population density of 6102 people per km2 (UNEP 2024a, 13). In some parts of Gaza, the population density was as high as 30 000 people per km2 (UNEP 2024a. 13). Of this large, concentrated population, many were under the poverty line, and 60% were refugees (UNEP 2024a, 13). In addition, Gaza had a young population, with 40% of the population being children under the age of 15 (UNEP 2024a, 13). It is clear that Gaza was already home to an extremely vulnerable population.
This vulnerability has only exacerbated since October 7, 2023. The number of people killed in Gaza is 57 680 (UNRWA 2025). In June 2024, this number was at 37 396, and it was possible that the total number killed could be as high as 186 000 if the indirect impacts of the conflict leading to death were conservatively estimated at 4 indirect deaths per 1 direct death (Khatib et al. 2024). Hence, total deaths, including indirect deaths, as of the July 2025 UNRWA report may be as high as 288 400 (or about 12% of the population) at the same rate of direct deaths to indirect deaths. In addition, 137 409 people have been injured and 1.9 million people (or 90% of the population) have been internally displaced, some ten times or more (UNRWA 2025). Of these fatalities and injuries, as of 11 November 2024, 174 deaths have been of journalists, while 101 have been injured, 30 detained, 115 journalists’ homes targeted, and 514 family members of journalists killed (UNRWA 2024). This represents 10% of all journalists in Gaza killed (UNRWA 2024).
Furthermore, in addition to targeting hospitals, such that 19 out of 36 hospitals were out of service as of 9 October 2024, Israel has created 7 mass graves of 520 bodies inside hospitals (Wood 2024; Chughtai and Okur 2024). And, if the total number of deaths are classified, as of 11 November, over 30% of them have been children, and over 40% have been women and children (UNRWA 2024). Among the children, 786 were children under the age of one, representing 6% of children killed who have been identified (UNRWA 2024). In addition, 35 055 children have lost one or both parents in the first year of the genocide (UNRWA 2024). These figures depict an irrevocable decimation of Palestinian identity, including the infliction of trauma on children to have generational impacts. Also representing this strategy of Israel’s is what has been described as scholasticide. In Gaza, 10 490 school and university students have been killed while 500 teachers and university staff have been killed (Turse 2024). In addition, 85% of the 564 school buildings in Gaza have been destroyed or damaged (Turse 2024).
To evaluate further, this integrated strategy pursued by Israel must necessarily go beyond the direct impacts observed to include indirect impacts so that longer-term impacts on both humans and the environment can be envisioned. It has already been explored how buildings are being targeted and people being displaced. This follows from Israel’s strategy to make Gaza uninhabitable by destroying the conditions for life and confining people to ever smaller regions (Albanese 2024). While 90% of the population has been internally displaced, at least 84% of the population have been directed to a “safe” zone which only represents 12.6% of the land (Albanese 2024, 8). This represents about 1.8 million people in an area of about 43.2 km2, or a population density of about 42 000 people per square kilometre – a density as high as urbanised cities with apartment buildings. This dynamic is accompanied by conditions described by 15 international organisations as apocalyptic in northern Gaza where famine is imminent (IPC 2024; UNRWA 2024). This is exacerbated by the restriction of aid, where aid had been completely blocked for over 80 days by 19 May 2025, and since resumed only slowly (UNRWA 2025). In addition, the small provision of aid is currently managed by a joint US-Israeli food distribution system described as a “death trap” due to the gunfire or shelling sustained by Palestinians awaiting aid (Knell 2025). At least 46 Palestinians have been killed waiting for aid (Knell 2025).
This strategy of starvation and bombardment has been accompanied by the targeting of WASH infrastructure leaving Gaza with sewage running everywhere and waste accumulating such that Gaza is described as “not a place for humans to survive” (OCHA 2024). Gaza is now considered among the 5 highest alert territories for catastrophic food insecurity, with 100% of the population facing crisis levels or worse (IPC 2025). Other concerning trends include the proliferation of diseases, such as polio which has now been detected for the first time in 25 years due to the destruction of water and sewage systems (Albanese 2024, 8). Overall, this scale of destruction has produced 42 million tonnes of rubble as of August 2024 (UNITAR 2024). In the figure below, it can be seen how this has been generated through the damage of what is nearly 63% of the structures in Gaza (UNITAR 2024).
It is evident that Gaza has seen unprecedented levels of humanitarian disaster. Moreover, it can be anticipated that the impacts which have led to this disaster may lead to environmental damage which is in furtherance of a strategy of genocide. Moreover, the impacts on people of displacement may themselves have impacts on the environment. Consequently, the impact of war in the environment in Gaza is explored next to explore how these strategies co-constitute ecocide.
Impact of War on the Environment
As of October 7, 2023, there has been an interruption of environmental management systems and services, a disruption of progressive environmental efforts, and the coordinated destruction of the environment. This is as a result of the genocide and to advance it. The impact of war on the environment of Gaza has been as unprecedented as the humanitarian impact. While the special rapporteur calls this an unquantifiable environmental cost (Albanese 2024, 6), there are ways in which at least some of the impacts on the environment may be quantified. In addition, while there is no precise baseline of ideal environmental conditions to which to compare what has occurred as of October 7, 2023, there is evidence of what environmental conditions have been prior to October 7. These assist in gaining an understanding of the escalation in scale of the environmental destruction at present. These pertain to environmental analyses conducted over previous years as well as the qualitative understanding of the Palestinian relationship to the environment, especially with life forms such as olive trees. These can be evaluated in the categories explored by the 2024 UNEP report – water; solid waste, infrastructure, and debris; energy infrastructure; marine environment; terrestrial environment; and air. However, these should be seen as somewhat overlapping. For instance, wastewater treatment being interrupted could have an impact on the marine environment. These impacts and links are explored below.
Water, wastewater treatment and sewage systems
With a resource like water which is integral to human survival, there is perhaps the closest interaction of humans and nature in a holistic environmental framework. Hence, understanding human use of water depicts the impact on the environment which may be resulting. For context, Gaza is situated on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea which touches its western border (UNEP 2024a, 13). The 2024 UNEP preliminary assessment has a look at what environmental conditions in Gaza were like before October 7, 2023. In terms of water, untreated or partially treated wastewater (including sewage) was flowing into the Mediterranean at a rate of 90 000 m3 per day in 2012, 100 000 m3 per day in 2016, and 110 000 m3 in 2018 (UNEP 2024a, 13).
This shows an increasing rate of pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the groundwater aquifer in Gaza has diminished over time due to the dual impacts of reduced rainfall and over-extraction by Gaza’s population who rely on wells due to poor access to water (UNEP 2024a, 13). Hence, the coastal aquifer is now 10 metres below mean sea level, with seawater intruding into it (UNEP 2024a, 13). Greater urbanisation has also contributed to this by increasing runoff and evaporation, preventing rainfall from reaching the aquifer (UNEP 2024a, 13). In addition, this has been polluted by pesticides and poorly treated sewage, such that there were high chloride levels and nitrate levels were found to be 6 times the safe amount (UNEP 2024a, 14). These conditions are intimately tied to human consumption which required 50 to 100 litres per person per day for basic needs (UNEP 2024a, 14). Before October 7, this was being provided by 300 wells across Gaza, 3 low-volume desalination plants, water piped by Israeli company Mekorot, and water in the form of aid by agencies such as UNRWA (UNEP 2024a, 14). In spite of this, only 6% of people in Gaza had access to water safe for consumption (UNRWA 2024, 14). So, it is conceivable that the increased vulnerability due to conflict may enhance the population’s reliance on the environment, increasing the negative impact.
Some strategies have been implemented since October 7, 2023, to address these conditions. These have included hydroponic techniques to reduce the use of water for agriculture, the treatment of wastewater to support irrigation, the collection of stormwater to recharge the aquifer, and the application of renewable energy sources to run desalination plants (UNEP 2024a, 15-16). These would all reduce the reliance on groundwater which has contributed to its depletion, as well as circumventing reliance on energy supply to run desalination or treatment plants. Another effort at environmental preservation has included the restoration of the Wadi Gaza wetlands which has included the removal of 35 000 tonnes of solid waste and the greening of 42 000 m2 of land (UNEP 2024a, 17).
Since October 7, 2024 and at the time of the UNEP report, all sources of water in Gaza have been disrupted, in addition to the damage or destruction of 57% of infrastructure and assets, the destruction of 162 of the 300 wells, the disruption of 2 of the 3 Mekorot connections from Israel, and the damage of desalination plants in the north and middle of Gaza (UNEP 2024a, 19). In addition, 3 of the 6 waste treatment facilities have been damaged (UNEP 2024a, 19). While people are thus having to use the remaining wells to access water which is brackish, has high levels of salinity and exposure to chemicals and pesticides, there are also implications for the inability to deal with wastewater, especially when the population is being displaced (UNEP 2024a, 19; UNRWA 2024). For instance, there may be implications from the sudden increase in Rafah’s population from 280 000 to over a million as of June 2024 (UNEP 2024a, 19; UNRWA 2024).
In addition to the stressors to both the supply of water (and hence reliance on the environment), and the disposal of wastewater, Israel has also been flooding tunnels under Gaza (UNEP 2024a, 21). Both the construction of these and their destruction can impact groundwater quality, with contaminants being able to leach into the soil when they are flooded (UNEP 2024a, 21). The land above can also be impacted by this if tunnels are collapsed (UNEP 2024a, 42). From the conflicts of 2008-2009 and 2014, there was already the pollution of farmland and urban areas with 100 000 m3 of wastewater which was found to be contaminated with heavy metals (UNEP 2024a, 21). The UNEP (2024a, 21) report identifies this to be at 60 000 m3 per day flowing mainly into the Mediterranean, based on an estimate of 70 000 m3 of water available per day as of March 2024. This significant increase does not bode well when untreated sewage contains pathogens, organic matter, plastics, and chemicals which may contaminate beaches, soils, the ocean, and groundwater sources (UNEP 2024a, 21). This is especially of risk to groundwater due to the high porosity of the soil (UNEP 2024a, 21). In addition, increased reliance on wells is not only depleting groundwater, but increasing seawater intrusion and the increase of salinity (UNEP 2024a, 21). Hence, there has been a significant deterioration of water resources, the extent of which cannot be fully ascertained until in-situ testing is possible.
Solid waste, infrastructure, and debris
In terms of waste and debris, before October 7, 1 726 tonnes of waste was being generated every day, with the largest landfill being the Johr Edeek landfill in the north containing 3.9 million tonnes (UNEP 2024a, 14). As a part of this, most medical waste was not being separated which possibly leads to contamination of land and groundwater, and disease transmission (UNEP 2024a, 14). However, this was still being treated in some forms at a rate of 1 to 1.5 tonnes per day. In addition to this, other periods of conflict have led to accumulation of debris from building destruction. For example, Israel’s offensive at the end of 2008 and the start of 2009 led to the damage of 2 692 buildings, generating 600 000 tonnes of debris (UNEP 2024a, 14). With the current appraisal of debris being 70 times that number, there is clearly a vastly larger impact on the environment.
Since October 7, there has been a similar interruption of waste disposal systems as water systems, which has seen the generation of 1 100 to 1 200 tonnes of waste per day by internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of November 2023 (UNEP 2024a, 22). Since then, this has likely increased, and the risk of this is exacerbated by the further damage of 5 out of the 6 solid waste management systems (UNEP 2024a, 22). Waste has also been burnt alongside firewood to provide energy due to the unavailability of gas, which contributes to air pollution and the incidence of respiratory diseases (UNEP 2024a, 22). While UNRWA has assisted in collecting waste, such as the 10 000 tonnes collected in Rafah and Khan Younis in January and February 2024, this will also be hampered by challenges faced by UNRWA (UNEP 2024a). This is due to limitations to their activity by Israel and efforts to completely ban them (Al Jazeera 2024). The risks which may follow from this are compounded by the large amount of debris in Gaza (42 million tonnes as of July 2024) which is contaminated with human remains and unexploded ordnance (UXO), the latter of which was estimated to stand at 7 500 tonnes in May 2024 (UNITAR 2024; UNEP 2024a, 23; Frayer and Baba 2024). These may further leach into the soil and aquifer (UNEP 2024a, 23). This is as the result of the destruction of over 60% of all physical infrastructure except WASH facilities, and 290 820 housing units (or 62%) at the time of the UNEP report (UNEP 2024a, 23). Figure 6.1 above displays the cartographic distribution of this form of destruction, which has increased to encompass 66% of buildings as of September 2024 (UNOSAT 2024). Put otherwise, each square metre of Gaza has produced an average of 114 kilograms of debris (UNITAR 2024). In perspective, this exceeds the debris produced in all conflicts in Gaza for the prior 16 years and is over 5 times more than the debris produced from the ISIL conflict in Mosul in 2017 (UNITAR 2024; UNEP 2024a, 23).
In Figures 6.2 and 6.3 below, it is shown how between May and July 2024, debris accumulated had increased by 3 million tonnes from 39 million to 42 million. This is possible to see where debris accumulation on the map gets darker, indicating growths of debris collecting. It can also be seen that debris in the northern parts of Gaza remained fairly similar, but high. Some areas had over 20 000 tonnes of debris, but debris in Rafah dramatically increased, coinciding with the offensive in Rafah commencing after May 2024, which is also where most Palestinians in Gaza have been displaced (Malm 2024, loc. 6 of 75; Albanese 2024, 8). Below, this accumulation will be qualitatively compared to other depictions of impacts on a map. For now, it is evident that the destruction depicted in Figure 6.1 corresponds with the debris accumulated shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3.
Given the findings of disruptions to waste systems, and the accumulation of solid waste in the form of debris, as visualised in the maps above, there may be further impacts to both humans and animals. This is in addition to risks to vegetation as a result of debris accumulation or the explosion of munitions or unexploded ordnances within the debris. One such threat includes the inhalation of dust, which is also implicated with air quality, to be explored below. Another is the presence of asbestos as a result of its use in older buildings. This may cause lung cancer, mesothelioma, larynx and ovarian cancer, or fibrosis of the lungs (UNEP 2024a, 27). This effect is not limited to humans. Animals are also at risk of fibrogenesis or carcinogenesis such as mesothelioma from asbestos exposure (Palmieri 2024; Holt 1974). This is a significant risk as it was estimated in the UNEP (2024a, 27) report that 800 000 tonnes of the debris was contaminated with asbestos. Finally, chemical concerns should also be noted with the destruction of the Gaza Industrial Estate, which may risk many hazardous chemicals causing pollution (UNEP 2024a, 27).
Energy infrastructure
Before 2023, to address Gaza’s energy challenges, there has been a growth in solar panel installations from 12 in 2012 to 8760 in 2022 (UNEP 2024a, 16). In addition, there have been UNDP installations at hospitals and schools, and for the treatment of wastewater (UNEP 2024a, 16). Finally, UNOPS has built a 721 KWp installation on the European Gaza Hospital as well as on 5 schools (UNEP 2024a, 16).
With the targeting of infrastructure in general discussed above, energy infrastructure has also been targeted. The Gaza Industrial Estate is of note because this also raises the matter of energy in Gaza, identified as an environmental category due to the impact that targeting of energy infrastructure may have. This is either directly, or indirectly by forcing people to rely on other sources. It has already been alluded to that there may be a risk of air pollution from people burning solid waste to generate energy. There are also implications for the treatment of wastewater or the desalination of water which may result from the destruction and damage of over 510 km of the electricity distribution network (or 61.5% of the total) (UNEP 2024a, 29). This may result in more pollution due to waste and more use of groundwater which would further its depletion. In addition, fires due to the targeting and damage of petrol stations and diesel power plants can exacerbate air pollution (UNEP 2024a, 30). Damage has already been sustained by 84 petrol stations and 5 wholesale petrol facilities while a fire was caused by the bombing of the diesel-powered Gaza Power Plant on 10 January 2024 (UNEP 2024a, 30). Risks from this also include groundwater which may be contaminated by leaking fuel. Other energy systems such as PV systems, 67 MW of which have been destroyed, have also contributed to ground pollution, with the release of 1.675 tonnes of lead into the environment (UNEP 2024a, 30). All the PV systems located at the Gaza Industrial Estate have also been destroyed (UNEP 2024a, 30). Risks of other heavy metals polluting the soil and water includes cadmium which is found in PV systems (UNEP 2024a, 30-31).
The level of the impact of such targets is not precisely quantifiable but as seen in Figure 6.4 below, a number of fires have been detected by satellites. Using the freely available data on fires from NASA-FIRMS, the figure below was produced by evaluating fires detected between 7 October 2023 and 12 November 2024. If the number of points on the map are counted in QGIS, it reveals a total of 489 fires detected by four satellite data sources (SUOMI VIIRS C2, J2 VIIRS C1, MODIS C6.1, and J1 VIIRS C1). With the UNEP (2024a, 36) report finding 165 fires in about the first 90 days, it is conceivable that this is a fair depiction, though its accuracy may be reduced as fires are only detected twice per day and fires extinguished quickly enough would not be detected. It can hence be considered that such fires not only contribute to air pollution, but the destruction of buildings and production of debris, and the destruction of vegetation. There is a clear overlap between the categories being discussed reflecting the complexity of the environment.
Compared to the figures showing debris and destruction above, Figure 6.4 does seem to have a lot of fires concentrated around Gaza City in the north, which has seen the most destruction. It should be noted that these fires may be lit by Gaza’s inhabitants to provide heat or for cooking. However, this figure accounts for larger and prolonged fires, and the UNEP (2024a, 36) report shows that fires of this type dramatically increased by nearly 150 times from 2022 to 2023, so these findings cannot be dismissed. Moreover if fires are being lit by inhabitants, these could also be considered unusual if they result from people having no access to electricity or gas and are burning solid waste or firewood.
Marine environment
It is clear that there is an overlap between the categories of analysis for evaluating the impact on the environment in Gaza. Hence, when looking at the impact on the marine environment, there has already been some discussion of the impact of wastewater being dumped into the Mediterranean Sea. While the precise impact is not known, untreated sewage, waste, and munitions may be contributing to pollution (UNEP 2024a, 31). This could result in illness in humans and animals from ingestion of water or seafood (UNEP 2024a, 31). In addition, microplastics and bacteria may bioaccumulate in marine food webs and persist over the long-term in the environment (UNEP 2024a, 32). Bacterial decay of organic matter such as that found in waste creates hydrogen sulphide and ammonia which are both toxic to marine organisms (UNEP 2024a, 32). However, only samples taken from the Mediterranean Sea or other water sources may provide an accurate portrayal of what the impact has been. Because this is made difficult by the ongoing conflict, these are some of the implications which the UNEP report identify as possibly arising from pollution due to wastewater, munitions, and solid waste.
Terrestrial environment
While there are not always precise measures available for every environmental category, at least prior to 2023, there is some information of the terrestrial environment. Gaza does possess arable land to grow citrus, vegetables, almonds, dates, olives, guavas, strawberries, and flowers (UNEP 2024a, 14) and this they have been doing for a long time as discussed above. Along the eastern part of Gaza, near the fences separating the strip from Israel, there is a roughly 3 to 5 kilometre-wide band of fertile ground where most of this occurs (Forensic Architecture 2024, 21). There is also a small width of soil along the northern bank of the Wadi Gaza in the north which is highly fertile (Forensic Architecture 2024, 21). However, there has been a deterioration of soil due to intensive agriculture which has also depleted groundwater and contaminated it with chemicals from fertilisers (UNEP 2024a, 14).
Since October 7, this has been exacerbated. It was found as of mid-February 2024, that 42.6% of cropland in Gaza had been damaged, with 43.1% of orchards, 41.2% of irrigated cropland, and 41.7% of rainfed cropland being damaged (UNEP 2024a, 32). As of 3 April 2024, 44 to 52% of tree crops had likely been damaged and 42% of greenhouses were more than 10% damaged, with 23% being completely destroyed (UNEP 2024a, 32). Depicted in Figure 6.5 below, this represents the work of Dr He Yin of Kent State University using satellite imagery. Red areas show damage to tree crops while dots coloured in gradients running from white to black show increasing amounts of greenhouse damages.
It is possible that this destruction is partly due to the cutting down of trees to have firewood to bake bread or to boil water (Wood 2024). However, this impact is also due to the impact of munitions which may also present a risk to farmland in the form of unexploded ordnances, or to the ground in the form of heavy metal pollution (UNEP 2024a, 35). The deliberate targeting of food systems has seen 70% of cropland destroyed and 70% of olive trees and orchards burned to the ground as of 1 September 2024 (FAO 2024a). This is a significant increase since Dr Yin’s analysis in April and resembles Israel’s similar strategy in 2009 (UNEP 2024a, 35). In 2009, Israel’s offensive saw the mechanical removal of trees and plants, leading to compression and thinning of topsoil, and increasing the risk of desertification (UNEP 2024a, 35). Importantly, these target orchards and olive trees, already discussed earlier to be vital environmental life forms in Gaza’s history. The Wadi Gaza in the north has also been severely impacted, with about 25 to 50% of it destroyed (UNEP 2024a, 34). This has impacts on the band of fertile land to its north.
Vegetation
Supplementing these findings is possible by using remote sensing techniques to make observations of the vegetation in Gaza. Figure 6.6 below shows a political map identifying the borders of the Gaza Strip as a beginning point.
Figure 6.7 below depicts changes in vegetation between 2022 and 2024. It comprises Landsat 8-9 satellite imagery of the same area from 10 June 2022 and 15 June 2024, obtained from EO Browser. Bands 4 and 5 imagery was extracted from these to calculate a Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) for each time. This displays the occurrence of biomass in an area (Dovgyi 2022, 109). This was done in QGIS, along with calculating a difference between the index for 2024 and 2022. This is displayed below, where redder areas indicate a decrease in NDVI, and bluer areas indicate an increase.
The same analysis was conducted for imagery taken from 28 June 2014 and 16 September 2014 (when Israel conducted a previous bombardment of Gaza) from the Landsat 8-9 satellite. This appears in Figure 6.8 below.
It is noticeable that while there is no concentrated observation in the rest of the region, Figure 6.7 shows that almost exactly where the Gaza Strip is located, there is a decrease in NDVI due to more red areas. This is despite the area being a small one, and sharing the same climate and weather conditions. This clearly shows the impact that conflict has had on the environment of the area for it is implausible that there may be another cause during such a short period of time, with a concentration on the Gaza Strip.
Figure 6.8 shows less of an impact, probably due to the decreased severity of the 2014 conflict (Buheji and Muhannadi 2024). However, it is worth considering if the impact observed (concentrations of redness in the Gaza Strip) is due to conflict. If compared to strike sites identified by a July 2014 UNITAR report, as seen as green points on Figure 6.9, there does seem to be an association between decreased NDVI and Israeli strikes (UNITAR 2014). This again strengthens the case that there is an observable impact on the environment due to conflict.
To supplement these findings is analysis done through the use of remote sensing of vegetation using Sentinel 2A satellite imagery. Comparing vegetation between 27 October 2021 and 26 October 2024 attempts to see if there has been a long-term shift in vegetation levels at a time more recent than the findings of the UNEP report. Furthermore, it is attempted to quantify this change. This attempted to replicate the process conducted by Forensic Architecture looking at the same impact between June 2021 and June 2024. Using their assumption that vegetation is present in areas with a vegetation index (NDVI) of above 0.2 (Forensic Architecture 2024, 247), total vegetation was analysed in Gaza and its regions between 2021 and 2024 to produce the following data.
Figure 6.10 above shows that in Gaza and each region of Gaza, there has been a decrease of over 50% of vegetation cover between October 2021 and October 2024. Analysis of the same satellite imagery but of the areas of Israel surrounding Gaza shows a stable, though slightly increased, level of vegetation. This is evidence that the change observable in Gaza is indeed due to war, and an Israeli strategy which does not also include the lands which are a part of Israel.
Figure 6.12 above depicts this in October 2021. Any land with a normalised difference vegetation index (NDVI) higher than 0.2 is considered as indicative of vegetation and hence coloured green. Anything lower than 0.2 is coloured white to indicate a lack of vegetation. Figure 6.13 depicts the same parameters analysed in October 2024. At first glance, there is a clear difference in the two depictions and there has been a vast decrease in vegetation in all parts of Gaza as reflected in the graph above.
Figure 6.14 below enhances this analysis by depicting areas in which vegetation was lost between 2021 and 2024 in red. This is transposed on the existing vegetation, coloured in green, present in October 2024. From this, the loss of vegetation can quite significantly be seen. Comparing it to the figures above, there is a similar geographical distribution of destruction, debris, fires, trees and cropland lost, and vegetation lost. These are particularly evident in the north of Gaza, in the middle of Gaza around Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and in Rafah in the south. And, from this analysis, it was found that 55.42% of vegetation was lost. This can be seen in Figure 6.10 where the total vegetation in Gaza decreases from an area of nearly 150 km2 to an area of about 65 km2.
Animals
There is no doubt that animals have likely been affected by this destruction. In fact, it has been found that 15 000 heads of cattle, or 95%, have died, and all calves have been slaughtered (UNRWA 2024). In addition, only about 25 000 sheep (or 43%), 3 000 goats (or 37%), and 34 000 birds (1%) are remaining alive (UNRWA 2024). This has resulted from the need to quickly move and leave animals behind, the lack of food for both humans and animals, death due to bombing, and the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and the restriction of input (UNRWA 2024; FAO 2024b).
Air
The impacts on the air quality in Gaza as a result of the impacts above and the military action by Israel is yet to be seen. While fires have been observed, and there is likely an impact due to the amount of debris and dust due to explosions, there is no open source air quality data which precisely quantifies air quality before and after. Despite this, the increase in number of fires, the air quality monitors in Israel near Gaza detecting a greater mean PM2.51 reading in 2023-2024, compared to 2022-2023, and the proliferation of respiratory diseases, all suggest significant air pollution (UNEP 2024a, 37). However, without precise readings from air quality monitors in Gaza, it is hard to assess if and how much measures such as PM2.5 concentration have exceeded safe limits (see footnote 2). The burning of plastic waste releases toxins, the burning of medical waste may release pathogens, and the burning of batteries may also release toxic chemicals (UNEP 2024a, 37). Furthermore, continued bombing spreads more dust and debris, including asbestos (UNEP 2024a, 37).
Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that there is a large, though not completely quantifiable, impact on the environment due to Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Water is being impacted both due to limits to access to water, the overuse of natural water resources and the mismanagement of wastewater. Waste is accumulating due to the disruption to management systems and debris is accumulating due to bombing. These have significant effects on the terrestrial environment and are especially concerning given the UXO and asbestos, as well as human remains, within the debris. The targeting of energy infrastructure has also led to more fires, disruptions to progresses made in renewable energy facilities, and possible pollution of the land by petroleum or heavy metals. The marine and terrestrial environments are being affected by these, the latter both through pollution and through physical change and loss of vegetation and animal life. And while impacts on air quality may not be clear, it is likely that they are significant or may be due to other impacts (such as fires or the burning of solid waste).
There are other areas of analysis which could provide further insight but are also hindered by a lack of information. For example, chemicals from weapons are not known, even though it is known that 75 000 tonnes of explosives have been dropped on Gaza, so the precise nature of the pollution is unknown (UNEP 2024a, 38; Chughtai and Okur 2024). However, it is conceivable that TNT and RDX from explosives may be carcinogenic, lead to liver or kidney damage, lead to nervous system damage, and bioaccumulate in water and soil resources and flora and fauna, leading to stunted growth and disease (UNEP 2024a, 40). Heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, and mercury can similarly bioaccumulate, lead to organ damage and developmental delays, or pollute the soil (UNEP 2024a, 40). Craters which have been studied before have already shown high levels of nickel, chromium, copper, manganese, and lead (UNEP 2024a, 40).2 There is also the risk of white phosphorous which has allegedly been used, and this leads to indiscriminate chemical burns when in contact with oxygen (UNEP 2024a, 38). Other imprecise estimates of the impact on climate change due to carbon emissions have been explored in the second chapter, though these are also imprecise (Neimark et al. 2024).
Overall, ecocide is unfolding in Gaza. This is especially if ecocide is defined as the destruction of the environmental ecosystem, with war, deforestation, mining, pollution, emissions, and any other deliberate destruction (Satgar 2018b, 55; Dunlap and Brock 2022, 2). Israel has destroyed the environment deliberately by bombing infrastructure, facilities, and buildings which lead to a build-up of solid waste, wastewater, and debris. These have been to target the conditions of life in Gaza (Albanese 2024). Evidently, this targets all conditions of life, not just humans, by having impacts on the environment in the form of pollution. Bombing has also directly impacted vegetation and animals, the latter of which have also been impacted by displacement of populations. There may also be conceivable impacts from the use of bombs with heavy metals which are yet immeasurable as the war unfolds. Flooding of tunnels with saltwater is another direct impact. Some even suggest that Gaza is being targeted so that oil reserves off the Palestinian coast may yield economic value for Israel and the US, representing a targeting of the environment in Gaza to enable further environment degradation (Malm 2024, loc. 36-37 of 75). Indirect impacts of war on the environment have also resulted from the humanitarian impact. Beyond the impacts of destroyed infrastructure and facilities, disruption to supply of electricity and water, as well as internal displacement, have resulted in increased reliance on wells for water. This has depleted water levels and risked saltwater intrusion. Other indirect impacts result from the burning of trees and solid waste for heat which has destroyed vegetation and generated air pollution. The environment is thus both the precise target of Israel, and collateral damage in its targeting of others. In short, whether targeting the environment directly or indirectly to kill people, or through indirect impacts of displacement, Israel is perpetrating an ecocide. This finding is made possible through the mixed-method analysis conducted above, recognising the complex relations between different beings in this war – the environment, people, weapons, plants, animals. A more precise understanding of this ecocide in relation to genocide, both as appendages of a colonial Eurocene form of life, is discussed next.
Ecocide and Genocide as Eurocene Appendages
On October 1, 2024, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, released a report which serves as an influential document towards understanding the situation in Gaza as genocide. In this report, she recognises that the occupation of Palestine since 1967 by Israel has already been ruled as unlawful by the ICJ in July 2024 (Albanese 2024, 3). This unlawful occupation has utilised force, racial segregation, and apartheid, as tactics aimed at annexation of Palestinian territories (Albanese 2024, 4). As an occupying power, this means that Israel cannot claim self-defence as a reason for military action in territories occupied such as Gaza (Albanese 2024, 4). In the present case, this means that not only is Israel’s offensive not one of self-defence, but it follows an agenda of occupation and annexation with the use of unlawful tactics including apartheid. These inform what has been Israel’s long-term intentional, systematic, and state-organised effort to forcibly displace Palestinians and replace them (Albanese 2024, 2).
With this context, the genocidal intent of Israel is established as one within the context of decades-long territorial expansion and ethnic cleansing for the colonisation of Palestine (Albanese 2024, 3). The location of this within a complex ecology of coloniality which includes Zionism was discussed earlier. This is furthermore established by the statements of Israeli officials, government ministers, and religious leaders which have encouraged this erasure and dispossession (Albanese 2024, 5). At the same time, the events in Gaza have escalated the violence, ethnic cleansing, and apartheid in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Albanese 2024, 5). In the report, these pieces of evidence support a legal establishment of genocidal intent in a variety of ways. First, the special rapporteur discusses the scale of destruction witnessed in Gaza, which was detailed above. Importantly, these suggest that the destruction of infrastructure is part of a strategy showing that Israel wishes to establish a permanent presence in Gaza (Albanese 2024, 8). In fact, 26% of Gaza is already being covered in Israeli roads and bases (Albanese 2024, 8). This desire to occupy requires both death and displacement. And, with any mass displacement of Palestinians in Gaza being for now precluded by the blockade, Israel is pursuing a strategy of destruction (Albanese 2024, 9). This is being carried out through starvation by targeting agricultural land and reservoirs or attacking aid convoys and people waiting for food and justifying this through a permissive interpretation of IHL (Albanese 2024, 9; Sultany 2024, 7). An Israeli human rights organisation, B’Tselem, asserts that this is the product of deliberate Israeli policy designed to “to wipe out Gaza” (Sultany 2024, 7). Concerningly, in spite of this, arguments endorsing the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza are gaining prominence (Shaw 2025, 418-419). Palestinians in Gaza thus face the threats of displacement and policies of starvation in furtherance of genocide.
In a dossier compiled by the Republic of South Africa, the evidence of genocidal intent in the speech of various figures is what supports this genocidal conduct. Indeed, they identify 20 senior government officials and 12 senior military officials making statements in support of this conduct, the dehumanisation of Palestinians, and the desire to completely destroy Gaza (Joyini 2024). In addition, 130 army officers were signatory to a statement against the delivery of humanitarian aid (Joyini 2024). There were also over 50 instances of documented conduct of soldiers which portray all Palestinians in Gaza as guilty, demand Gaza being totally destroyed, advance Biblical justifications for dehumanising and destroying Palestinians, support the displacement of Palestinians and resettlement of Gaza, and perform acts desecrating Palestinian corpses or destroying and defiling Palestinian homes (Joyini 2024). One letter by an army commander represents this by asserting that the war on Gaza should “pulverize every accursed plot of land” and “destroy it and the memory of it” (Sultany 2024, 13).
Perhaps emblematic of this genocidal rhetoric at all levels are statements such as those by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich calling starvation “justified and moral” (Albanese 2024, 9). He has asserted that pressure from the international community has prevented Israel from completely starving Gaza (Times of Israel 2024). In addition, the former Head of the Israeli National Security Council has suggested that all aid should be blocked and epidemics used as a tactic of war (Albanese 2024, 9-10). The President of Israel, Isaac Herzog, has also said that for October 7, there is an “entire nation out there that is responsible” (Albanese 2024, 26). The rhetoric of these officials alludes to the underlying Israeli policy to commit genocide in Gaza. This engages dehumanisation, starvation, and epidemics as some other violent appendages to effect a genocide alongside ecocide.
The ways in which these statements and acts operate together have had consequences for the West Bank and East Jerusalem too. Former Minister of Defence, Yoav Gallant, suggested that the operation in Gaza be projected to Judea and Samaria (West Bank) (Albanese 2024, 10). This has come to fruition in some ways, with there being, since October 7, 2023, 5505 raids by Israeli forces, 1084 settler attacks supported by Israeli forces, 692 deaths, 169 children killed, and 5199 injuries (Albanese 2024, 11). This represents a 900% increase of deaths from the average of 69 deaths per year for the previous 14 years, and a 250% increase of the death of children from the previous 9-month average (Albanese 2024, 11). In addition, of the children killed, 80% were shot in the head or torso (Albanese 2024, 11). This has been accompanied by 9400 detentions of Palestinians including academics, students, lawyers, journalists, and human rights activists who are designated as terrorists and are subjected to abuse, brutality, torture, and rape (Albanese 2024, 11). Smotrich and Foreign Minister Israel Katz have also alluded to Palestinians being Nazis whose cities must be turned into a pile of rubble (Albanese 2024, 11-12). Finally, the West Bank has seen the replication of strategies used in Gaza such as air raids and the targeting of hospitals (Albanese 2024, 12). Furthermore, military authority has recently been transferred to civilian authority, signalling an acceleration of the West Bank’s annexation and resettlement (Albanese 2024, 13).
Based on this, Albanese (2024, 15-16) considers whether all these acts taken together indicate a pattern of genocidal intent, even if they may also constitute other charges such as war crimes. This would entail an intent to destroy the foundation or will of the people to live, and their relationship to their culture, heritage, and land, such that they can never be reconstituted (Albanese 2024, 16-18). And, while individual actions may perpetuate this, it is not precluded from aggregating into the responsibility of the state (Albanese 2024, 18-19). In addition to the evidence of the destruction in Gaza explored above, this understanding establishes genocidal intent in numerous ways. First, this project of genocide can be seen to support a foundational aim of the Zionist project, Greater Israel (Eretz Yisrael), which is necessarily impeded by Palestinians, hence demanding their erasure (Albanese 2024, 20, 30). This has been realised through the increase in colonies and settlements that has recently taken place (Albanese 2024, 21). It is also reflected in rhetoric such as Netanyahu’s presentation of a map of Israel erasing Palestine to the General Assembly in September 2023 (Albanese 2024, 21). To effect this, Palestinians are dehumanised or portrayed as security threats, justifying their displacement, detainment, and death (Albanese 2024, 21). Quite explicitly, rather than beginning on October 7, Gaza’s colonisation is a part of a longer strategy which is reflected in a leaked concept paper outlining Gaza’s colonisation premised on October 7 (Albanese 2024, 21).
Indeed, even before October 7, Israel’s use of international law has been to inflict violence on Palestinians. This has been by framing Israeli actions as the pursuit of law and order, redefining civilians as combatants, practicing deliberate disproportionality in responses, and asserting that Palestinians are used as voluntary human shields (Sultany 2024, 8; Shaw 2025, 418). These have blurred the lines between peace and war to justify Israel’s colonial strategy within IHL, demonstrating an intent preceding October 7, 2023. At present, this means that Israel is able to argue that it is not breaking the law but acting precisely in accordance with the law, as it did before the ICJ (Shaw 2025, 418; Verdeja 2025, 11).
Besides the rhetoric, ideological roots, and extension to the West Bank, this genocide has manifested in a variety of ways. These include mass killing and the rendering of Gaza unliveable through the targeting of WASH infrastructure, schools, hospitals, places of worship, and the environment (Albanese 2024, 22). This furthers a severance of the connection of Palestinians with their land, undermining their food sovereignty and culture, and decimating their social fabric (Albanese 2024, 23). For instance, hospitals seen as medical shields allows Israel to interpret IHL to target medical facilities and disrupt their role in societal survival (Sultany 2024, 11). This will inevitably lead to severe psychological harm from the experience of Palestinians with torture, degrading conditions, trauma, maiming, and even mass graves (Albanese 2024, 23).
Israel further targets Palestinians by wantonly killing women and children to prevent their reproduction as a group (Sultany 2024, 15). The targeting of UNRWA and other UN agencies in Gaza is another dimension in which the conditions of life are being decimated in Gaza (Albanese 2024, 23). These patterns, and the scale discussed above, all point to Israel’s attack on Palestinians in Gaza and their capacity for long-term survival and renewal (Albanese 2024, 24). Like Lemkin’s view of Nazi policies in Europe as genocide by making life itself an act of physical survival, Israel is pursuing policies to cripple life in Gaza (Shaw 2025, 417).
In light of this, and the ICJ ruling on the unlawfulness of the occupation, it is not possible for Israel to reasonably claim that their actions constitute self-defence (Albanese 2024, 25). This is especially when their offensive has disproportionately targeted civilians and removed their “civilian-ness” with Israel’s vastly superior military capabilities (Albanese 2024, 25-26). This suggests that their prolonged engagement must signal a different intent to that claimed (Albanese 2024, 25-26). In fact, despite claims to be engaging in Gaza for the release of hostages, more hostages have been killed by Israel than rescued and negotiations with Hamas have deliberately been sabotaged (Albanese 2024, 26-27). With these defences for Israel not being possible, the state can be held responsible for actions or omissions which have led to genocide (Albanese 2024, 27). Furthermore, Israel can be understood to have genocidal intent in what has amounted to the destruction in whole, or in part, of the Palestinian people (Albanese 2024, 24). This is based on the scale of destruction, the non-compliance with ICJ rulings to refrain from acts of genocide, inciting it or aiding it, and reporting on it (Albanese 2024). It is also based on the documented statements of leaders and the military in Israel, and the general impunity and active encouragement practiced by the judiciary, attorney general, Knesset, and media (Albanese 2024). These statements further represent the widespread support for the genocide by the Israeli public (Shaw 2025, 418).
Despite the aforementioned arguments establishing Israel’s genocidal intent, Israel’s effective use of IHL as well as the Holocaust, has meant that scholars have debated whether Palestinians in Gaza are facing genocide (Verdeja 2025, 6). This has not been seen in other genocides in Myanmar, Sudan, or Rwanda, representing a crisis of the international order itself (Verdeja 2025, 6, 8). Yet, the recognition of Israel’s actions as a genocide of Palestinians in Gaza is now finding consensus amongst legal scholars (Sultany 2024, 25). Hence, these legal identifications of a genocide taking place since October 7, 2023, are important for the elements they highlight. These include dehumanisation, the creation of conditions preventing reconstitution of life, and the broader strategy of Zionist occupation. However they could further be understood from other perspectives which highlight the underlying colonial logics targeting life, including the environment. A starting point for this is understanding colonial strategies as structures, not events, which fluidly target various aspects of a group’s life (Wolfe 2006, 388; Nijim 2023, 173). Necessarily including a negative dimension which erases colonial subjects, these structures also include positive elements which replace those erased (Wolfe 2006, 388). Removing Palestinians through genocide is thus co-constituted by the construction of what replaces it – Israel. This has been discussed earlier, in terms of the narratives and modes aiding Zionist occupation. However, seeing genocide as a structure rather than an event, enables a more holistic appreciation of the cross-temporal and spatial dimensions of coloniality and the manifold targets it impacts (Wolfe 2006, 403; Nijim 2023, 173).
An instance of this is Israel’s increasing shift away from relying on Palestinians for labour (Wolfe 2006, 403). With growths in reliance on migrant labourers, Palestinians become marked as unnecessary for the capitalist system and become dispensable, as reflected in their increased enclosure (Wolfe 2006, 404). Before this, Israel ensured through the Oslo Accords that it could maintain control of critical components of life in Palestine – water, power, labour, borders – allowing it to later exploit or deny these (Nijim 2023, 183). Remembering Raffles’ discussion of the dehumanisation of people and their eradication as diseases through strategies like quarantining, adds a new understanding to the dehumanisation of Palestinians. This has taken place long before 2023, through the blockade of Gaza and the targeting of hospitals and use of mass graves. Genocide has been well under way for Palestinians who have been marked for death. In blockading Gaza and denying its people dignity by labelling them all terrorist, as well as consistently revisiting destruction upon it, genocide has come in waves like the “operations” in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021 (Nijim 2023, 177, 180). More than a legal argument, the political and moral arguments of Israel’s exceptionality determine which bodies die and which do not (Verdeja 2025, 8).
As perhaps a necropolitics subjecting life to death, Israel may more broadly be visiting death on all beings in Palestine and Gaza – people, infrastructure, culture and heritage, the environment (Gray 2025, 65; Nijim 2023, 183). They have even targeted mosques and churches in Gaza, museums, cultural centres, and archives – killing the very idea of Palestine (Gray 2025, 66). Moreover, the exceptional claim to Jewish identity and the Holocaust for Israel helps occlude this, representing Israel’s work across time to perpetrate violence (Sand 2009).
Apart from identifying the longer pattern of the dehumanisation of Palestinians or the ways in which coloniality, Zionism, and the Eurocene form of life is able to define what is human and living to erase them, there are other forms in which death and genocide exist as structures. For instance, on October 7, the vastly inferior technologies of the Palestinian fighters were able to overpower the occupation (Malm 2024, loc. 46-47 of 75). This has been met with swift reinforcement of the technological superiority of the Israeli military, supported by the United States with weapons, technology, and strategies of surveillance, to execute a devastating genocide (Malm 2024, loc. 46-47 of 75; Stoler 2016, 50). Hence, Israel has been able to harness the devastating capabilities of technology to conduct a genocide that can be witnessed around the world but is still somehow allowed to occur. As discussed earlier, this technology in fact contributes to the impact on the environment.
However, more than technology as an appendage of the Eurocene violence, there are other appendages. The war on infrastructure described above, as well as the longer practice of destroying, appropriating, or de-Arabising Palestine targets life in Palestine by destroying its identity and memory (Nijim 2023, 170-171). This allows the colonial construction of Zionism, and targets the environmental repositories of identity like olive trees and orange groves, to destroy Palestinian culture itself (Nijim 2023, 170-171). As much as planting olive trees could be seen as resistance to coloniality by eschewing productivist views of the environment and providing for future generations, Israel’s disproportionate targeting of children reveals coloniality at work in severing intergenerational being (Nijim 2023). Moreover, in blockading Gaza and making it reliant on aid, Israel creates an aid economy which values Palestinian suffering, even as their labour becomes dispensable (Nijim 2023, 183-184). This suffering, induced by targeting children, traumatising people, making them dependent on aid, and exhausting their resistance, may be fostering a social crisis which further strikes at Palestinian identity (Nijim 2023, 185-187).
Seeing genocide structurally, and encompassing all these elements, makes it possible to see it in action since at least 1917. From then, lands have been seized, communities have been massacred such as at Deir Yassin, wars have been fought such as in 1948 and 1967, and Palestinian resistance has been suppressed (Nijim 2023, 191). Even in hiding this long history, pointing to Israel’s democracy, and seeing Palestinians as terrorists who cast the first stone on October 7, 2023, the many atrocities repeatedly visited upon Palestine are occluded (Ajour 2025, 12). This also makes it possible to see the many colonial strategies used by Zionism as strategies of death – perpetuating genocide and gradually seeing the land as so tied to Palestinian identity that ecocide eventually also became necessary.
Puar (2015) identifies other elements in this colonial matrix. The infrastructural warfare and policy to maim and disable Palestinians, rather than only designed to enforce death on Palestine, enforces a right to suffer that denies death to Palestinians because they cease to become human (Puar 2015). While providing a justification for Israel which keeps it operating within human rights and humanitarianism, Palestinians seen as non-humans are valuable in asserting the Israeli moral superiority (Puar 2015). They are also of value as victims of the recurrent cycle of destruction which can create not only the extractive economy of aid and militarism, but reconstruction (Puar 2015). In keeping Palestinians alive but suffering, in other words, a living dead, their dehumanisation reaffirms Israeli humanity and generates economic value in the weapons that kill and maim them (Puar 2015). Their economic value is also espoused in the aid which does not ease their suffering, and the reconstruction costs after each war (Puar 2015).
Time and space are important to this perspective. Coloniality uses time to keep Palestinians suspended in recurring bouts of suffering, but the use of maiming visits upon them a permanent suffering which gets underreported next to deaths (Puar 2015). Indeed, even if a ceasefire is reached, the suffering of war will not end for the at least 137 409 people injured or the millions traumatised due to injury, loss, and displacement (UNRWA 2025). At the same time, weapons which will have a lasting impact on the land are used to devastating effect (Puar 2015). These include weapons containing depleted uranium with its toxic half-life of 4.5 million years, or white phosphorous with its associated birth defects (Puar 2015). Children are targeted so that the trauma generated in them can create bodies of victims, resistance deemed terrorist, or suffering to last far beyond the present (Puar 2015). Even space is used to look beyond the horizontal plane to the verticality of the heights at which Israelis settle above Palestinians (Puar 2015). Lower down, Israel operates in the subterranean depths where brackish water collects, toxic pollutants taint the soil, histories affirming coloniality reside or are effaced, or tunnels for resistance get flooded (Puar 2015).
Genocide could thus been seen as a legal definition, which Albanese argues is met in Gaza through ideologies and practices of coloniality which dehumanise Palestinians and perpetrate devastating violence. As a structure, it may occupy a longer period, but encompasses the various strategies which target the very idea of Palestine – its people, buildings and infrastructure, culture, future generations, and environment. This is done through various modes such as enclosure, dehumanisation, and technology. Or, Palestinian genocide is complete because they become so dehumanised that their lives are not worthy of death. As objects, they may be allowed to occupy a place of suffering to maintain the moral superiority of their occupier, reaffirm their dehumanised form, and extract economic value of economies of war, aid, and reconstruction. A common element between all these views is that across both time and space, life and death are reconfigured in unexpected ways to render Palestinians non-human, dead, or living dead. This is done in ways that preclude no other colonial subject, like the environment, from becoming an “other” from which coloniality may extract value, render valueless, or enforce violence upon. They are harmed from this violence, whether as a target or collateral damage.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to rethink IR by discussing the continuation of Gaza, and Palestine’s, occupation by the Eurocene order as Zionism. This has discussed the devastating humanitarian impact which it has seen, and the impact of the environment which has simultaneously occurred. This was discussed in terms of water, waste and infrastructure, energy, the marine environment, the terrestrial environment, and air. These were discussed as complex but interrelated categories in which Israel’s war has directly targeted the environment or seen it as collateral damage as ecocide in the savage ecology of Eurocene ordering. Each of these realms have witnessed impacts, even if they are not all directly observable as yet – something achievable only when Palestine can speak. A precise measure was obtained, however, to see that as of October 2024, about half of all vegetation had been killed, in comparison to levels in 2021.
Going further than the precise links in which war and population displacement have led to direct and indirect impacts of war on the environment, it was considered how genocide is argued to be occurring in Gaza. In a legal sense, or a longer structural sense, Israel has targeted various facets of being in Gaza and Palestine more broadly, to achieve the colonial project of Zionist settlement. This occurs across time and space. More than this, understandings of life itself may be undergoing reconfiguration in Gaza so that those dehumanised are not just killed, but allowed to continue to suffer so that their death or suffering may extract value.
From either view, ecocide and genocide exist together as appendages of Zionism. Ecocide is pursued, constituting genocide by severing the historical and contemporary links and interdependencies between people and the land. In severing these ties, Israel is utilising ecocide as a strategy to prevent what Albanese (2024) calls the reconstitution of Palestinian people in Gaza. The biological conditions of life are being threatened through the targeting of sources of food and the limitation and depletion of water sources. Genocide is pursued, constituting ecocide by enforcing increasingly restrictive and violent conditions on all beings. This leaves marks upon the land both in terms of the direct impacts of weapons or the indirect impacts of infrastructural destruction and population displacement.
Both in terms of the impact of war on the environment as ecocide, and the genocide in Gaza, this analysis has shown that a longer colonialism has featured through Palestine’s history as a structure and not an event. Defying the linearity of coloniality, this does not silence the past or await the future, but sees the past in the present and the present in the future. There are a few instances of this. Even before October 7, 2023, some of the impacts on the environment have already been underway. These include the intrusion of saltwater into the groundwater table due to overuse of wells as a result of unstable water supply, or the heavy metals which were found in bomb crater sites. The marks of the present on the future will likely be quite significant, and this may be conceivable from the same heavy metals observed from the past which, in the bombs used today, may continue to have impacts. The trauma and violence of the present will also undoubtedly be felt in the people, animals, and environment of Gaza – whether in the polluted waters, the landscapes rendered barren, or the obvious scars of war. There may also be the construction of economic value in this destruction through a future need for clearing of debris and the “rebuilding” of Gaza. Though, this may simply ready Gaza for another round of violence even as its land and people bear the persistent trauma and damage of previous ones. Rethinking IR in this context thus becomes essential.
This represents the work from my Master’s research, which can be found in full here.
- PM2.5 refers to fine inhalable particles which are less then 2.5 micrometres in diameter which may enter the lungs and the bloodstream, posing risks to health such as premature death, heart attacks, asthma, decreased lung function, and other cardiac or respiratory issues (EPA 2024a; EPA 2024b). It may also cause acidification in lakes, deplete nutrients in soil, damage sensitive plants and ecosystems, or contribute to acid rain, though the impacts are dependent on precisely which particles are present (EPA 2024a). WHO guidelines prescribe that this should not exceed concentrations of 5 micrograms per metre cubed as annual averages, though in 2021, Gaza had an annual mean of 20.1 micrograms per metre cubed (WHO 2021). However, the precise measure since October 7 is not known. ↩︎
- Heavy metals can have impacts on human and animal health similar to asbestos by causing different types of cancer and may also impact fertility (Najar et al. 2015, 157). These may bioaccumulate in ecosystems if they are in soil which provides nutrients for plants eaten by humans and animals. They may also change the acidity or texture of soil, impacting its fertility, or leaching into the groundwater below (used by Palestinians in Gaza as a water source) (Najar et al. 2015). This study found varying results of different heavy metals but which demonstrated levels at bomb crater sites between 2 and 7.3 times higher than average levels for cadmium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese, between 20 and 42 times higher than the average for tungsten and mercury, and between 25 and 300 times higher than the average for molybdenum (Najar et al. 2015, 157). This study compared these levels not to a safe prescribed maximum, but to average levels set as controls from locations unaffected by bombs (Najar et al. 2015, 152). ↩︎